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Zero-Determinant Strategies in the Iterated Public Goods Game
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Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, People’s Republic of China
Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-
player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant
strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents or to enforce a linear relationship between his own
payoff and the opponents’ payoff, in a unilateral way. This paper considers zero-determinant strategies in the
iterated public goods game, a representative multi-player evolutionary game where in each round each player
will choose whether or not put his tokens into a public pot, and the tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor
larger than one and then evenly divided among all players. The analytical and numerical results exhibit a similar
yet different scenario to the case of two-player games: (i) with small number of players or a small multiplication
factor, a player is able to unilaterally pin the expected total payoff of all other players; (ii) a player is able to set
the ratio between his payoff and the total payoff of all other players, but this ratio is limited by an upper bound
if the multiplication factor exceeds a threshold that depends on the number of players.
I. INTRODUCTION
Iterated games have long been exemplary models for the
emergence of cooperations in socioeconomic and biological
systems [1–6]. Learned from these studies, the most signifi-
cant lesson is that in the long term, selfish behavior will hurt
you as much as your opponents. Therefore, from both scien-
tific and moral perspectives, ants and us all live in a reassuring
world: altruists will eventually dominate a reasonable popula-
tion. Very recently, however, Press and Dyson [7] have shat-
tered this well-accepted scenario by introducing a new class
of probabilistic memory-one strategies for the two-player it-
erated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), so-called zero-determinant
(ZD) strategies. Via ZD strategies, a player can unilaterally
pin his opponents’ expected payoff or extort his opponents by
enforcing a linear relationship between his own payoff and
the opponents’ payoff. In a word, egotists could become more
powerful and harmful if they know mathematics. Though be-
ing challenged by the evolutionary stability [8–10], studies on
ZD strategies as a whole [7–15] will dramatically change our
understanding on iterated games [16, 17]. Indeed, knowing
the existence of ZD strategies has already changed the game.
ZD strategies in IPD can be naturally extended to other
iterated two-player games [18], which are still uncultivated
lands for scientists. Instead, we turn our attention to the iter-
ated multi-player games and try to answer a blazing question:
could a single ZD player in a group of considerable number of
players unilaterally pin the expected total payoff of all other
players and extort them? This paper focuses on a notable
representative of multi-player games, the public goods game
(PGG) [19, 20]. In the simplest N -player PGG, each player
chooses whether or not contribute a unit of cost into a public
pot. The total contribution in the public pot will be multiplied
by a factor r (1 < r < N ) and then be evenly divided among
all N players, regardless whether they have contributed or
not. As a simple but rich model, the PGG arises a question
why and when a player is willing to contribute against the
∗Electronic address: zhutou@ustc.edu
obvious Nash equilibrium at zero [21], which is critical for
the understanding, predicting and intervening of many impor-
tant issues ranging from micro-organism behaviors [22, 23] to
global warming [24–27]. Among a couple of candidates [28–
34], the repeated interactions may be a relevant mechanism
to the above question, since reputation, trustiness, reward and
punishment can then play a role [35, 36]. We thus study the
iterated public goods game (IPGG, also named as repeated
public goods game in the literatures) where the same players
in a group play a series of stage games.
It is found by surprise that the ZD strategies still exist for
a group with many players in IPGG, namely a single player
can pin the total payoff of all others or extort them in a uni-
lateral way. However, different from the observations in IPD,
there exists some unreported restrictive conditions related to
the group size and multiplication factor, which determine the
feasibility to pin the total payoff of all other players and the
upper bound of extortionate ratio.
II. ZD STRATEGIES IN MULTI-PLAYER GAMES
Consider an N -player iterated game, which consists of a
series of repetitions of a same stage game of N players.
Press and Dyson [7] proved the theorem that, in such an iter-
ated game, if the stage games are identically repeated infinite
times, a long-memory player will have no advantage over a
short-memory player. Without loss of generality, it is suffice
to derive players’ strategy assuming they have only memory-
one. Thus, which action a player will take in the current round
depends on the outcome of the previous round. For an arbi-
trary player X ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, a (mixed) strategy pX is a
vector that consists of conditional probabilities for cooperat-
ing with respect to every possible outcome. Since we consider
a general N -player game and every player may choose coop-
eration (C) or defection (D), there are 2N possible outcomes
for each round. For player X , his memory-one strategy can
be represented by a 2N -dimensional vector:
pX =
[
pX1 , · · · p
X
i , · · · p
X
2N
]T
, (1)
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FIG. 1: Illustration of the general three-player game. (a) For a previous state CDD, the conditional probabilities that the players X , Y and Z
select C in the current round are pXC,0, pYD,1 and pZD,1, respectively. Therefore, the probability from the previous stateCDD to the current state
CDC is pXC,0(1− pYD,1)pZD,1. (b) shows the 23 = 8 different states, the strategy vectors and payoff vectors of the three players. According to
Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), the Markov transition matrix M for the present case is shown in (c). After some elementary column operations on matrix
M− I, the dot product of an arbitrary vector u with the stationary vector v is equal to the determinant det(pX ,pY ,pZ ,u) as shown in (d),
where p˜X , p˜Y and p˜Z lie in the forth, sixth and seventh columns which are only controlled by the players X , Y and Z, respectively.
where pXi stands for the conditional probability that X
will cooperate in the current round, given the outcome
of the previous round. Here i=1, 2, · · · , 2N is the in-
dex of possible outcomes in each round. Figure 1
shows an example for an N=3 game, in which the play-
ers are X , Y and Z , and the possible outcomes are
{CCC,CCD,CDC,CDD,DCC,DCD,DDC,DDD}.
In many multi-player games such as public goods game
[19, 20], N-player snowdrift game [37], N-player stag-hunt
game [38] and collective-risk social dilemma [25], whether
a specific opponent chooses to cooperate is less meaningful,
instead, it is crucial for a player to know how many his oppo-
nents cooperate. In such a scenario, if a player X’s previous
move is C and the number of cooperators among the oppo-
nents in the previous round is n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}, the prob-
abilities for him to cooperate in the current round are denoted
as pXC,n. Similarly, if his previous move is D and the number
of cooperating opponents is n, the probability to cooperate is
pXD,n. Therefore, the original strategy vector in Eq. (1) can
be refined to a 2N -dimensional vector with 2N independent
3variables as:
pX =[pXC,0, · · · , p
X
C,n, · · · p
X
C,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N−1n ) terms
, · · · , pXC,N−1,
pXD,0, · · · , p
X
D,n, · · · p
X
D,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N−1n ) terms
, · · · , pXD,N−1]
T .
(2)
Figure 1(b) gives an example of the strategy vectors for the
three-player case.
Starting at an initial outcome, the N players’ strategy pro-
file determines a stochastic process. Since these are memory-
one strategies, the corresponding stochastic process can be
characterized by a Markov chain. Each possible outcome
of the repeated games can be maintained by a state in this
Markov chain model. Under this model, the state transition
rules are joint probabilities calculated from the N players’
probabilistic strategies. Denoting the corresponding transition
matrix as:
M = [Mij ]2N×2N , (3)
where the element Mij is a one-step transition probability of
moving from state i to state j. It is essentially a joint proba-
bility that can be calculated as:
Mij =
∏N
X=1
mX , (4)
where X runs over all players, and
mX =
{
(pX
C,n(i))
hXj (1− pX
C,n(i))
1−hXj , if X takes C in state i;
(pXD,n(i))
hXj (1− pXD,n(i))
1−hXj , if X takes D in state i.
(5)
Here n(i) is the number of cooperators amongX’s opponents
in state i. hXj is an indicator, a binary variable determined
by player X’s action in state j. Conventionally, if player X’s
action in state j is C, then hXj = 1; otherwise, hXj = 0.
Figure 1(c) shows M for the general three-player game. It
can be easily checked that the sum of each row equals 1.
In Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), the transition probabilities are de-
pendent on all the N players’ strategies, reflecting the com-
plexity of the multi-player games. However, the approach
proposed by Press and Dyson [7] allow us to derive a class of
strategies succinctly, but profoundly. Define a matrix M′ =
M− I, where I is the unit diagonal matrix. After some ele-
mentary column operations on this matrix, the joint probabil-
ities will be finely separated, leaving one column solely con-
trolled under player X’s strategy but not dependent on other
players anymore. This column p˜X is shown as follows:
p˜X =[−1 + pXC,0, · · · ,−1 + p
X
C,n, · · · ,−1 + p
X
C,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N−1n ) terms
, · · ·
− 1 + pXC,N−1, p
X
D,0, · · · , p
X
D,n, · · · , p
X
D,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N−1n ) terms
,
· · · , pXD,N−1]
T .
(6)
In Eq. (6), all the probabilities depend only on the elements
in Eq. (2), which indicates that p˜X is unilaterally controlled
by player X . Note that p˜X is a 2N -dimensional vector, and
the elements −1 + pXC,n and pXD,n each appears
(
N−1
n
)
times.
Figure 1(d) gives an example of the unilateral control for the
general three-player game. We can see that the forth, sixth
and seventh columns in this matrix only involve the strategies
of players X , Y and Z , respectively.
If the transition matrix M is regular, i.e., the Markov chain
is irreducible and aperiodic, it will be ensured that there exists
a stationary probability vector v, such that
vT ·M = vT . (7)
The stationary vector v is the very eigenvector correspond-
ing to the eigenvalue 1 of M. Press and Dyson [7] prove that,
there is a proportional relationship between the stationary vec-
tor v and each row in the adjugate matrix Adj(M′), which
links the stationary vector and the determinant of transition
matrix, such that:
vT · u = det(p1, · · · ,pX , · · · ,pN ,u), (8)
where (p1, · · · ,pX , · · · ,pN ,u) is a 2N × 2N determinant
and u is the last column of M′. This theorem is of much
significance since it allows us to calculate one player’s long-
term expected payoff by using the Laplace expansion on the
last column of M′. Let uX denote the payoff vector for the
player X . Replacing the last column of M′ by uX , we can
calculate player X’s long-term expected payoff as:
EX =
det(p1, · · · ,pX , · · · ,pN ,uX)
det(p1, · · · ,pX , · · · ,pN ,1)
, (9)
where 1 is an all-one vector introduced for normalization.
Each player X’s expected payoff depends linearly on its own
payoff vector uX . Thus making a linear combination of all
the players’ expected payoffs yields the following equation:∑N
X=1
αXE
X + α0 =
det(p1, · · · ,pX , · · · ,pN ,
∑N
X=1 αXu
X + α01)
det(p1, · · · ,pX , · · · ,pN ,1)
,
(10)
where α0 and αX (X = 1, 2, · · · , N) are constants.
This important equation reveals the possible linear relation-
ship between the players’ expected payoffs. Recalling that in
the matrix M′ there exists a column p˜X totally determined by
pX , if player X sets pX properly and makes p˜X being equal
to a linear combination of all the players’ payoff vectors such
that:
p˜X =
∑N
X=1
αXu
X + α01, (11)
then he can unilaterally make the determinant in Eq. (10) van-
ished and, consequently, enforce a linear relationship between
each player’s expected payoff, as:∑N
X=1
αXE
X + α0 = 0. (12)
4Since the determinant of M′ is zero, the strategy pX which
leads to the above linear equation Eq. (12) is a multi-player
zero-determinant strategy of player X . Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that player 1 is the player adopting ZD
strategies, and investigate the relationship between 1’s strat-
egy p1 and its opponents’ total expected payoff
∑N
X=2E
X
.
Hereinafter, the superscript 1 of p1C,n and p1D,n are all omitted
for simplicity.
III. ITERATED PUBLIC GOODS GAMES
Public goods games have been widely studied to examine
the behaviors in the context of social dilemma. In this section,
we use the iterated public goods game as a common paradigm
to study the multi-player ZD strategies. In the public goods
games, there are N players who obtain an initial endowment
of c > 0. Without loss of generality, we set c = 1. Each
player chooses either to cooperate by contributing the endow-
ment c = 1 into a public pool, or to defect by contributing
nothing. The total contribution will be multiplied by a factor
r (1 < r < N ) and divided equally among the N players. An
arbitrary player X’s payoff at state i then reads
uXi =
r(n(i) + hX)
N
+ (1− hX), (13)
where n(i) is the number of cooperators among X’s N − 1
opponents in the state i, and hX = 1 if player X chooses to
cooperate and hX = 0 otherwise. Hence the payoff vector
of player X is uX = [uX1 , · · · , uXi , · · · , uX2N ]
T
. Figure 1(b)
gives an example of the payoff vectors for three-player game.
We will investigate two kinds of specializations of ZD strate-
gies, namely pinning strategies and extortion strategies.
A. Pinning Strategies
In this paper, when talking about pinning strategies, we
mean a specialization of ZD strategies that can be adopted by
a player to control the total expected payoff of all otherN − 1
opponents, instead of the expected payoffs of some certain op-
ponents. This is because as we have mentioned above, in the
public goods game, the information about how many oppo-
nents will cooperated is very important while whether a spe-
cific opponent will cooperate is less meaningful. If the player
1 wishes to exert a unilateral control over his opponents’ total
expected payoff, he can set p1 properly and make p˜1 identical
to the last column in the determinant such that
p˜1 = µ
∑N
X=2
uX + ξ1. (14)
Then, the determinant will be zero, and a linear function of all
opponents’ expected payoffs will be established as:
µ
∑N
X=2
EX + ξ = 0. (15)
Note that Eq. (14) consists of a set of 2N equations. Af-
ter eliminating the redundancy ones, there remains 2N inde-
pendent linear equations which exactly correspond to the 2N
independent elements in the strategy vector:
pC,n = 1 + µ
r(n+ 1)(N − 1) + (N − 1− n)N
N
+ ξ,
(16a)
pD,n = µ
rn(N − 1) + (N − 1− n)N
N
+ ξ, (16b)
with n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}. In Eqs. (16), there are 2N prob-
abilities pC,n and pD,n, and the coefficients µ and ξ are con-
trolled by player X . One can represent all the other 2N − 2
probabilities by means of pC,N−1 and pD,0, which are the
probabilities for mutual cooperation and mutual defection, re-
spectively. While pC,N−1 and pD,0 themselves are given by:
pC,N−1 = 1 + µ(N − 1)r + ξ, (17a)
pD,0 = µ(N − 1) + ξ. (17b)
The parameters µ and ξ should satisfy the probability con-
strains pC,N−1 ∈ [0, 1] and pD,0 ∈ [0, 1]. From the two equa-
tions above we can get the allowed value ranges of µ and ξ.
Denote µ and ξ as follows:
µ = −
1− pC,N−1 + pD,0
(N − 1)(r − 1)
, (18a)
ξ =
1− pC,N−1 + rpD,0
r − 1
. (18b)
Introducingµ and ξ back into Eqs. (16), we can investigate the
feasible regions for all the probabilities pC,n and pD,n. If the
probability constrains for all pC,n and pD,n can be satisfied
within n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}, it means the pinning strategies
exist.
Furthermore, we can also investigate the total expected pay-
off of all opponents. Substituting Eqs. (18) into Eq. (15)
yields:
∑N
x=2
Ex = −
ξ
µ
= (N −1)+
(r − 1)(N − 1)pD,0
1− pC,N−1 + pD,0
. (19)
Hence, the opponents’ total expected payoff is still determined
only by pC,N−1 and pD,0. If pC,N−1 and pD,0 satisfy a linear
relationship γpD,0 + pC,N−1 − 1 = 0 (i.e., γ = 1−pC,N−1pD,0 ),
then Eq. (19) can be rewritten as:
∑N
x=2
Ex = (N − 1) +
(r − 1)(N − 1)
1 + γ
. (20)
The opponents’ total expected payoff then depends only on
the number of players N , the multiplication factor r, and the
parameter γ.
After combination and reduction, Eq. (16a) and Eq. (16b)
5can be written in the following format:
pC,n = 1 +
µ
N
{[r (N − 1)−N ]n+ (N − 1) (r +N)}+ ξ,
(21a)
pD,n =
µ
N
{[r (N − 1)−N ]n+ (N − 1)N}+ ξ,
(21b)
in which N , r are constance if the game setting is fixed. We
can see in the above two inequations, a comment term refer-
ring to variable n is µn
(
r − N
N−1
)
(N − 1). pC,n and pD,n
are functions with variable n, and their monotonicity is deter-
mined by n’s coefficients µ and
(
r − N
N−1
)
. So let us discuss
about different cases of
(
r − N
N−1
)
.
Case 1. When r < N
N−1 , Eqs. (16) are monotonously
increasing functions of n, It is then sufficient to check pC,n
and pD,n at the lower bound and upper bound of n. Since
pC,N−1 and pD,0 should be selected in the feasible region, we
need only to check n = 0 for pC,n and n = N − 1 for pD,n.
Then the probability constrains become:
pC,0 = 1 + µ(N − 1 + r
N − 1
N
) + ξ ≥ 0, (22a)
pD,N−1 = µr
(N − 1)2
N
+ ξ ≤ 1. (22b)
By substituting Eqs. (18) into Ineqs. (22), we have
rpC,N−1 + (rN −N − r)pD,0 − r + rN −N ≥ 0,
(23a)
(rN −N − r)pC,N−1 + rpD,0 − 2rN + r + 2N ≤ 0.
(23b)
The two feasible half-planes respectively constituted by Ineq.
(23a) and Ineq. (23b) intersect at the point
(p∗C,N−1, p
∗
D,0) =
(
1−
rN −N
N + 2r − rN
,
rN −N
N + 2r − rN
)
.
(24)
Obviously, p∗C,N−1 and p∗D,0 satisfy the linear relationship
p∗C,N−1 + p
∗
D,0 = 1, and it is easy to validate that p∗D,0 <
0 when r < 1, implying that there is no feasible region for
pinning strategies for r < 1.
When r = 1, the point (p∗C,N−1, p∗D,0) = (1, 0), which is
the unique feasible point. From Eq. (16a) and Eq. (16b) it can
be found that µ = 0 and ξ = 0 when (pC,N−1, pD,0) = (1, 0),
where the singular strategy is pC,n = 1 and pD,n = 0 for
n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}. Under such case, to enforce a pinning
strategy, a player should always cooperate once he starts the
game with cooperation, or, always defect once he starts the
game with defection. The expected probability he will take
C or D depends on the initial probability distribution over his
pure strategy space. Then, the state transition matrix M in Eq.
(3) becomes a block diagonal matrix with two closed com-
municating classes, which indicates that the Markov chain’s
stationary distribution is not unique (i.e. depending on the
initial distribution), suggesting that this transition matrix does
pC,N−1
p
D
,0
0
1
1
N − N
r
(
1−
rN−N
N+2r−rN
, rN−N
N+2r−rN
)
1−N + N
r
FIG. 2: The feasible region of the pinning strategies when 1 < r <
N
N−1
, which is determined by the intersection of the two half-planes
formed in terms of the two linear inequalities in (23), except for the
singular point (pC,N−1, pD,0) = (1, 0).
not essentially have a stationary distribution with respect to
a unit eigenvalue. Consequently, in the case of r = N
N−1 ,
the expected payoff cannot given by the determinant form as
proposed by Press and Dyson [7].
When 1 < r < N
N−1 , the conditions 0 < p
∗
C,N−1 < 1 and
0 < p∗D,0 < 1 are ensured, which means there always exists a
feasible region for pinning strategies. The corresponding fea-
sible region is emphasized by dark blue, as shown in Fig. 2.
Then, the minimum value of all opponents’ total expected
payoff can be reached when pD,0 = 0 and pC,N−1 6= 1:(∑N
x=2
Ex
)
min
= (N − 1). (25)
If pC,N−1 = 1 and pD,0 6= 0, the maximum value is:(∑N
x=2
Ex
)
max
= r(N − 1). (26)
Therefore, the player 1 can pin his opponents’ average ex-
pected payoff to the range between 1 and r when r < N
N−1 .
Case 2. When r = N
N−1 , the intersecting point reads
(p∗C,N−1, p
∗
D,0) = (0, 1) and a pinning strategy can be ob-
tained through arbitrarily selecting pC,N−1 and pD,0 in the
region of [0, 1] except for the singular point (pC,N−1, pD,0) =
(1, 0). Along the line γpD,0 + pC,N−1 = 1, the opponents’
total excepted payoff can be pinned into the value determined
by Eq. (20), dependent on the parameters N , r and γ. The
maximum and minimum values of player 1’s excepted pay-
off occurs when all opponents choose always-C and always-D
strategies, respectively.
Case 3. When r > N
N−1 , Eqs. (16) are monotonously
decreasing functions of n. It is thus sufficient to check the
maximum value pC,0 and the minimum value pD,N−1. Then
6pC,N−1
p
D
,0
1
0
(
2r−rN+N
r
, 1
)
rN−N−r
r
r
rN−N−r
1
FIG. 3: The feasible region of the pinning strategies when r > N
N−1
,
which is determined by the intersection of the two half-planes formed
by the two linear inequalities in (28). The intersected region is a
convex hull with four extreme points. The region shrinks while the
gradients of the two confine lines approaches each other.
the probability constrains becomes:
pC,0 = 1 + µ(N − 1 + r
N − 1
N
) + ξ ≤ 1, (27a)
pD,N−1 = µr
(N − 1)2
N
+ ξ ≥ 0. (27b)
Following a similar procedure as Case 1, by substituting Eqs.
(18) into Eqs. (27), we can get:
rpC,N−1 + (rN −N − r)pD,0 − r ≤ 0, (28a)
(rN −N − r)pC,N−1 + rpD,0 − rN + r +N ≥ 0, (28b)
each of which constitutes a closed half-plane in the two-
dimensional real space R2. These two half-planes intersect
at the dark blue region in Fig. 3, with four extreme points
(0, 1), (0, rN−N−r
r
), (2r−rN+N
r
, 1) and (1, 0). The feasi-
ble region converges to a line pC,N−1 + pD,0 = 1 when
rN−N−r
r
= r
rN−N−r
, i.e., r = N
N−2 . The feasible region for
the pinning strategies vanishes when r > N
N−2 . Meanwhile,
considering r > N
N−1 , now we have the two boundaries, as
N
N − 1
< r ≤
N
N − 2
. (29)
According to Eq. (20), we can obtain the minimum and
maximum values of the opponents’ total expected payoff in
the case of r > N
N−1 :(∑N
x=2
Ex
)
min
∣∣∣γ= r
rN−N−r
= r(N − 2 +
1
N
),
(30a)(∑N
x=2
Ex
)
max
∣∣∣γ= rN−N−r
r
= (N − 1) + r(1 −
1
N
).
(30b)
When r = N
N−2 ,
∑N
x=2E
x = (r+1)
2
2(r−1) .
In summary, given the multiplication factor r, if player 1
wants to pin the total expected payoff of all other opponents,
it is required that N ≤ 2r
r−1 . Or, in a fixed group size N , the
player 1 can do this only when 1 < r ≤ N
N−2 . The upper
bound of r as a function of the group size N is presented in
Fig. 4. Pinning the total expected payoff of all other oppo-
nents is becoming difficult as N grows. Figure 5(a) shows an
example 3-player IPGG, where the ZD player X can pin his
opponents’ total expected payoff into a fixed value, while his
own payoff depends on the opponents’ behaviors: if he would
like to set a high value, he may lose more.
3 10 100
1
2
3
N
r
 
 
Allowed region
Upper bound
FIG. 4: Log-log plot of the upper bound of r. The upper bound is a
monotonously decreasing function of the group size N , namely with
the increasing of N , the allowed region of multiplication factor for a
pinning strategy shrinks.
In the above analysis, one player’s strategy is only condi-
tioned on how many of his opponents cooperate while the
detailed information about who cooperate is less important.
Such settings may essentially reduce the constrains for the ex-
istence of pinning strategies. When considering more compli-
cated scenarios, the constrains necessarily become more strict.
For example, there may be more linear inequalities to be sat-
isfied in Eqs. (28) and Eqs. (23). Each inequality constitutes
a half-space in the m-dimensional real space Rm where m is
the number of probability variables in the inequality set. Find-
ing the feasible region of pining strategies is then transferred
to the calculation of the intersections of these m half-spaces,
which is equivalent to a traditional linear programming prob-
lem. Furthermore, since the feasible region for a pining strat-
egy is essentially a convex hull, when analyzing the properties
of the pinning strategies, it is sufficient to concentrate on the
extreme points. Such feature brings us convenience to further
study the game’s equilibriums.
Our analysis indicates that, in an N -player IPGG with
proper settings, one player can unilaterally control the op-
ponents’ total expected payoff and pin it to a fixed value by
playing ZD strategies. In this case, the pinned total expected
payoff of opponents is no less than the total endowment of
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FIG. 5: The payoff of the focal player X against the average payoff of the other two players in an example 3-player IPGG with r = 1.6
fixed. (a) The pinning strategy pX = [0.08, 0.15, 0.15, 0.22, 0.17, 0.24, 0.24, 0.31]T , corresponding to the state sequence of CCC, CCD,
CDC, CDD, DCC, DCD, DDC and DDD. (b) The χ-extortion strategy with the minimal χ = 0.5 (i.e., χ(N − 1) = 1) and pX =
[1.0, 0.9, 0.9, 0.8, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.0]T , where the ZD player X fairly shares the surplus with his opponents. (c) The χ-extortion strategy with
χ = 7.9 and pX = [0.87, 0.87, 0.87, 0.86, 0.01, 0, 0, 0]T , which is close to the upper bound χ = 8. (d) The Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS)
strategy with pX = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1]T for comparison, where the average payoff of the two opponents will distribute a two-dimensional
area. Each plot reports the aggregated results from 106 independent stage games, where each data point represents the result of one stage
game. In each stage game, the strategies of X’s two opponents are assigned randomly.
them, which indicates that the player using pinning strategy is
nice and may run risk to decrease his own payoff (as indicated
by the short horizontal line to the left of the diagonal line in
Fig. 5(a)). Generally, in an IPGG, a player can pin the oppo-
nents’ total expected payoff when the group size N does not
exceed an upper bound, or, when the multiplication factor is
not too large. That is to say, the condition for pinning multi-
ple players’ total expected payoff in the IPGG is more strict
than pinning a single opponent’s expected payoff in a two-
player IPD. In Appendix A, we prove that, in the multi-player
IPGG, a ZD player cannot unilaterally set his own expected
payoff, analogous to the two-player IPD. In Appendix B, we
show that in the multi-player IPGG, two or more players can-
not collusively control other players’ payoff.
B. Extortion Strategies
Besides pinning the opponents’ total payoff, a ZD player
can also extort all his opponents and guarantee that his own
surplus over the free-rider’s payoff is χ-fold of the sum of
opponents’ surplus. This is the so-called χ-extortion strat-
egy, where χ is the extortionate ratio. Formally, the extortion
strategies for a ZD player 1 is:
p˜1 = Φ
[
(u1 − 1)− χ
N∑
X=2
(uX − 1)
]
. (31a)
Solving this vector equation gives us 2N linear equations:
pC,n = 1 + Φ
(
rn
N
− χ
rn(N − 1)− nN
N
)
+Φ
(
r −N
N
− χ
r(N − 1)
N
)
, (32a)
pD,n = Φ
(
rn
N
− χ
rn(N − 1)− nN
N
)
, (32b)
for n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} and pC,n, pD,n ∈ [0, 1].
When χ ≥ 0, r−N
N
− χ r(N−1)
N
is always negative. If
Φ < 0, the term in the bracket in Eq. (32b) should be non-
positive to make pD,n ≥ 0, leading to pC,n > 1, which
is out of the probability range. The case of Φ = 0 corre-
sponds to the singular strategy of pC,n = 1 and pD,n = 0 for
n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}. Thus it is required that Φ > 0. In this
case, we have the following linear inequalities as constrains
for the extortion strategies:
r(n+ 1)−N
N
− χ
r(n+ 1)(N − 1)− nN
N
≤ 0, (33a)
rn
N
− χ
rn(N − 1)− nN
N
≥ 0. (33b)
Given n, χ is determined by both r and N . This is different
from the two-player IPD [7] whereχ can take any value. From
the above two sets of constrains for χ, if r ≤ N
N−1 ,
χ ≥
1
N − 1
. (34)
else, if r > N
N−1 ,
1
N − 1
≤ χ ≤
r
r(N − 1)−N
. (35)
Figures 5(b) and 5(c) show the numerical example of extortion
strategies. Within the allowed range of χ (as shown in the
above inequalities), the average payoff of all other opponents
falls in a line.
For any value of r, χ has its lower bound. When r >
N
N−1 , χ also has its upper bound
r
r(N−1)−N . Normalizing∑N
X=2(u
X − 1) by the number of opponents (N − 1), the
ZD player can extort over the average payoff of his opponents
by an effective ratio χ(N − 1), which has an upper bound
8r(N−1)
r(N−1)−N . For sufficiently large N ,
lim
N→∞
χmax(N − 1) =
r
r − 1
. (36)
In Fig. 6, we show the value of χmax(N − 1) as a function of
the group size N and the multiplication factor r, in the region
r > N
N−1 . As shown in Eq. (36) and Fig. 6, for large N , r
can be very close to 1, leading to a large maximum effective
extortionate ratio χmax(N − 1). However, under such case, a
player is usually not willing to cooperate and thus the payoff
in addition to the endowment is tiny. That is to say, although
the effective extortionate ratio can be huge, the extorted payoff
is not much.
FIG. 6: The upper bounds of χ(N − 1) (represented by different
colors) versus N and r, in the region r > N
N−1
and N ≥ 3.
Substituting the bounds of χ into the probabilistic strategies
in Eqs. (32), we can obtain the allowed range for Φ as:
Φ ≤
1
χ
r(n+1)(N−1)−nN
N
− r(n+1)−N
N
, (37a)
0 < Φ ≤
1
rn
N
− χ rn(N−1)−nN
N
. (37b)
According to the monotonicity, these two inequalities can be
reduced to:
0 < Φ ≤
N
N − r + χr(N − 1)
. (38)
Note that N
N−1 is monotonously decreasing with N . Thus
given a specific multiplication factor r, the extortionate ratio
χ is more likely to have an upper bound when more players
are involved in the game. This means in a game with more
players, it will be more difficult for the extortioner to secure
his own payoff by using ZD strategy and setting a fixed ratio
between his and the opponents’ surplus. A tricky strategy of
the extortionate player thus will be restrained when he plays
with more opponents. On the other hand, given a fixed group
size, a large r will shrink the feasible range of the extortion-
ate ratio. A large multiplication factor r results in a better
reward for each player, which promotes mutual cooperations.
Therefore, the above analysis reveals the significant fact that,
to reduce the possible injuries from a crafty egoist, increasing
the cooperation incentive r is an effective approach.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
The discovery of ZD strategies makes us both excited and
worried, since a selfish person seems to have a more power-
ful mathematical tool to extort payoffs from those kindhearted
and simpleminded people. Although some recent works [8–
10] suggested that the extortion strategies in two-player IPD
are not evolutionary stable, a few ZD players can still extort
other non-ZD opponents in a population. Indeed, compared
with those well-known game strategies [2], the ZD strategies
are too complicated to be mastered by normal persons, who
will eventually become exploitees in the present of ZD play-
ers.
To explore the general applicability and limitations of ZD
strategies, we have taken a step from two-player games to
multi-player games, with the iterated public goods game be-
ing the selected template. The bad news learned from our
study is that a single ZD player can unilaterally pin the total
expected payoff of all other opponents and extort them by en-
forcing a linear relationship between his own payoff and the
opponents’ total payoff. A good news from the results is that
the capacity of a ZD player to either pin or extort other op-
ponents is more strictly limited compared with the two-player
games. Roughly speaking, we can suppress the influences of
the ZD player by increasing the number of participants and/or
encouraging cooperation via enlarging the multiplication fac-
tor. Taking the global warming problem as an example, if
we have made more people being aware of the seriousness of
such issue and understanding that the abandonment of some
environmentally costly lifestyles is of great significance for
the sustainable development, we can to some extent enlarge
N and r and thus suppress ZD players. Another good point
is that when there are more than one ZD players in the IPGG,
they cannot collusively control others but each fights his own
battle.
Iterated games with private monitoring represent long-term
relationships among players where each player privately re-
ceives a noisy (imperfect) observation of the opponents’ ac-
tions [4]. The difficulty of handling such games comes from
the fact that players do not share common information under
private monitoring, and the decision making in such games in-
volves with complicated statistic inference. Consequently, the
analysis, optimization, cooperation enforcement and control
in such games have been known as long-standing challenges.
This subclass of game theory has found a wide range of appli-
cations [39], such as evolution in a realistic noisy environment
[40, 41] and agent planning under uncertainty [42]. Whether
ZD strategies still works in the noisy environments? Is it still
possible for a crafty egoist to control the payoffs of his oppo-
nents? These questions ask for future in-depth understanding
of ZD strategies.
Both the origin of life and the formation of human societies
require cooperation [33, 43]. During the history of biolog-
9ical evolution, animals and microorganisms such as vampire
bats, three-spined sticklebacks, cleaner fishes and bacteria can
recognize the importance of reciprocity and even cooperate
according to tit-for-tat strategy [44–47]. Male side-blotched
lizard and Escherichia coli can play the rock-paper-scissors
game in order to maintain biodiversity [48, 49]. Human is
the champion of cooperation. With the growth, children may
change from selfishness to egalitarian [50]. It is worth ex-
ploring whether we can find some field evidences that human
beings and animals may be already aware of the existence of
ZD strategies during the biological evolution.
Researchers can also design laboratory experiments and
study responses of human beings when facing ZD strategies
[51]. A player may vary his strategy frequently that cannot
generate a Markovian stationary state. Therefore, there are
some interesting problems such as whether some proper ZD
strategies can control opponents’ payoff in a short timescale
and how a smart player alters his ZD strategies in terms of his
opponents’ responds. And of course, we firstly want to know
whether a normal person will become crazy when facing a
crafty ZD player.
Furthermore, for a large population, an individual cannot
interact with everybody else. Some individuals usually inter-
act more often than others. The spatial structures of popula-
tion may affect the maintenance of cooperation. Then some
questions natural arise, for example, what is the relationship
between the different population structures and related ZD
strategies and whether the cooperation can sustain in dynamic
social network with the evolution of ZD strategies [27, 29–
34, 52]. Network analysis is then expected to plays a signifi-
cant role [53].
Different from the Prisoner’s Dilemma game which charac-
terizes the pairwise interaction, the public goods game depicts
the group interaction. In the pairwise Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, only two players take part in one game. If both of
them are extortioners, their surpluses become zero that leads
to the evolutionary instability of extortion strategies in an in-
finite population. However, for the public goods game, N
players participate in one game. It is difficult to ensure all
players are aware of the existence of ZD strategies and use the
extortion strategies. Hence, comparing with the pairwise Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game, the situation for public goods game is
more complicated when considering the evolutionary stabil-
ity. It is relatively easy to analyze the evolutionary stability
of ZD versus special strategies, such as always cooperation,
always defection, win-stay-lose-shift, and so on. Since the
strategy space of public goods game is very huge compar-
ing with Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we should carefully con-
sider how to perform Monte Carlo simulations of population
in the framework of weak mutation similar to Ref. [9]. More-
over, in this paper we only consider the extortion strategies.
Recently good strategies in IPD have been studied [10, 11],
which can to be extended to multi-player IPGG by replacing
1 in Eqs. (31) with r. Then the robustness of good and gen-
erosity strategies can be deeply analyzed in the next step. In
addition, the evolutionary stability analysis of IPGG can also
be combined with the studies on the effects of reward and pun-
ishment [28, 54, 55].
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Appendix A: X tries to set his own payoff
A ZD playerX cannot unilaterally set his own payoff in the
PD, here we obtain the same conclusion for iterated PGG. If
he tries to set his own payoff, he must choose p˜X = α1S1 +
α01. The linear equations now become
pC,n = 1 + α1
r(n + 1)
N
+ α0, (A1)
pD,n = α1
rn+N
N
+ α0. (A2)
Setting pC,N−1 and pD,0 as free variables, we have
α1 =
pC,N−1 − pD,0 − 1
r − 1
. (A3a)
α0 =
rpD,0 − pC,N−1 + 1
r − 1
. (A3b)
Since pC,n, pD,n are decreasing functions of n, we have
pC,N−2 = 1 + α1
r(N − 1)
N
+ α0 ≥ 0 (A4a)
pC,0 = 1 + α1
r
N
+ α0 ≤ 1 (A4b)
pD,N−1 = α1
r(N − 1) +N
N
+ α0 ≥ 0 (A4c)
pD,1 = α1
r +N
N
+ α0 ≤ 1. (A4d)
After some algebra, (A4b) can be reduced to
pD,0 ≤
(N − r)pC,N−1 − (N − r)
rN − r
. (A5)
Since r ≤ N for PGG, this leads to pD,0 ≤ 0. So a ZD player
X cannot set his own payoff.
Appendix B: Collusive strategies
In the determinant form of player’s payoff, there are
columns which are controlled by more than one players. This
suggests that there might be collusive strategies, which means
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more than one players trying to control other players’ pay-
off collusively. However this type of ZD strategies gener-
ally does not exit. Take the two−player collusive strate-
gies as an example. Denote the column controlled tangly
by the player X and Y by p˜q. For general ZD strategies
p˜q =
∑N
X=1 αXSX + α01, the following 2N linear equa-
tions must be satisfied: pC,nqC,n = 1 + Θ1, pD,nqD,n = Θ2,
pC,nqD,n = Θ3, and pD,nqC,n = Θ4. Here Θ1,Θ2,Θ3 and
Θ4 depend on the specific values of αk and α0. From the
above constrains, we obtain
pC,nqC,n
pD,nqC,n
=
pC,nqD,n
pD,nqD,n
. (B1)
This is a very strong constraint, and generally cannot be satis-
fied.
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